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Abstract 
When participants are asked to provide confidence judgments for each provided alternative in 
a multiple-choice memory task, such judgments are inflated if assessed alternatives are 
accompanied by an implausible (dud) alternative.  This finding, termed the dud-alternative 
effect, has been recently documented in a memory setting with a line-up procedure 
(Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011).  In the present study we develop a novel paradigm to 
investigate the dud-alternative effect in memory.  The paradigm utilizes a multiple-choice 
associative recognition task in which dud alternatives can be rejected on the basis of their 
unfamiliarity.  In two experiments we demonstrate a reliable dud-alternative effect with our 
novel procedure.  The results demonstrate that the dud-alternative effect in episodic memory 
is not limited to tasks based on perceptual factors but is a general phenomenon concerning 
confidence judgments.    
Keywords: Duds, Confidence, Recognition, Metacognition  
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The Dud-Alternative Effect in Memory for Associations: Putting Confidence into Local 
Context. 
When faced with a task of remembering, people often consider evidence supporting 
multiple alternatives.  How sure is a person that she parked her car today at the entrance and 
not closer to the parking gate?  How sure is she that she saw the person number five robbing 
the old lady and not the person number four?  It seems logical that when assessing confidence 
for multiple alternatives, confidence is reduced if there is strong evidence supporting each 
alternative (Clark, 1997).  But what happens with confidence when there is very little 
evidence in support of one (or more) of the alternatives?  The most intuitive prediction would 
be that nothing much happens – the implausible alternative is simply eliminated and 
confidence depends on evidence supporting the remaining alternatives.  However, some 
recent evidence indicates that this intuition is incorrect and such alternatives do have an 
important effect on confidence, an effect that is examined in the present study. 
 Windschitl and Chambers (2004) introduced the dud-alternative effect whereby the 
inclusion of implausible (dud) alternatives in a multiple-choice question inflates the judged 
likelihood of other, plausible alternatives relative to a case in which duds are absent.  For 
example, in the dud-absent condition of their Experiment 1, participants were asked which of 
the following alternatives was selected in a recent survey of American 7-10 year-olds to be 
their favorite food for dinner: Pizza or Hamburger.  In the dud-present condition, the question 
included two additional dud alternatives: Eggplant Parmesan and Grilled Fish. Windschitl 
and Chambers found that likelihood judgments for the plausible alternatives (Pizza and 
Hamburger) were higher in the dud condition compared to the no-dud condition.  The effect 
generalized across a number of different tasks and conditions.  For example, the judged 
likelihood of winning a raffle was increased if some players (duds) were added that had very 
few tickets.  Also, the effect occurred regardless of whether the task directed participants’ 
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attention to a particular alternative (e.g., “How likely do you think it is that pizza was the 
most frequently selected option?”) or if ratings were required for all alternatives.  The finding 
is non-normative because adding more alternatives should either reduce (if they are plausible) 
or leave unchanged (if they are completely implausible) the judged likelihood of the original, 
plausible alternatives, but they should never increase it.   
Windschitl and Chambers (2004) accounted for their finding with a contrast 
hypothesis.  According to it, participants judge the likelihood of a given alternative by 
comparing it (explicitly or implicitly) against the likelihood of the other alternatives.  By this 
hypothesis, the inclusion of duds increases the number of comparisons that strongly favor the 
focal alternative currently being judged, which, in turn, increases its judged likelihood.  
 Although not the focus of Windschitl and Chambers (2004) research, the authors 
nevertheless predicted that a similar effect would occur with episodic memory judgments.  
Recently, Charman, Wells, and Joy (2011) confirmed this prediction using a line-up 
identification procedure.  They found that including duds in the line-ups (i.e., foils that were 
highly perceptually dissimilar to the actual perpetrator) increased confidence that the 
remaining, non-dud foils matched the perpetrator.  Thus, consistent with Windschitl and 
Chambers’ predictions, the study by Charman et al. indicated that dud alternatives can 
increase confidence for non-dud alternatives in episodic memory tasks as well as other 
likelihood judgment tasks. 
 However, Charman et al. (2011) suggested that the dud-alternative effect in line-ups 
might stem from a different mechanism than the analogous effect with non-episodic 
likelihood judgments.  Specifically, they argued against the contrast hypothesis and in favor 
of a perceptual similarity account.  This account postulates that inclusion of duds in line-ups 
causes the non-dud alternatives to be perceived as more perceptually similar to the memory 
representation of the actual perpetrator, which, in turn, elevates confidence.1   
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Although Charman et al. (2011) did not delineate the exact psychological mechanism 
of how duds affect perceived similarity between non-dud line-up member and the memory 
representation of a perpetrator, work by Tversky (1977) may be helpful in this regard. 
Tversky argued that changing the local context in which similarity judgments are made by 
including a novel alternative could broaden the set of features that are considered diagnostic 
of category membership, a phenomenon referred to as the extension effect.  Applying this 
logic to Charman’s et al. recognition results, if all non-dud members of a line up share a 
particular feature (e.g., blonde hair) with the memory representation of the perpetrator, that 
feature is nondiagnostic for recognition: All non-dud members are perceived to be equally 
similar to the memory representation with respect to hair color and so the feature cannot be 
used to differentiate amongst the candidates and may not even be considered at all.  However, 
when the line-up also includes a dark-haired suspect (dud), hair color acquires diagnostic 
value, boosting the perceived similarity between non-duds and the memory representation.  
That is, in this new context, non-duds share the feature “blonde hair” with the perpetrator 
whereas the dud does not, and so the presence of the dud facilitates the perceived similarity 
(and judged likelihood) between non-dud line-up members and the memory representation.  
However, despite this potential role of feature diagnosticity on perceived similarity, in 
our view, the perceptual similarity hypothesis proposed by Charman et al. (2011) is overly 
narrow.  When several alternatives of what happened in the past are considered, it is rare that 
the question boils down to which alternative is most perceptually similar to what is in 
memory.  Consequently, the main empirical objective of the present study is to demonstrate 
that the dud-alternative effect occurs in episodic memory tasks for which perceptual 
similarity plays a minimal role. 
 For this demonstration, we developed a novel paradigm.  Our procedure is based on 
associative recognition, a memory task requiring retrieval of inter-item associations (e.g., 
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Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Verde, 2004).  Participants in our paradigm decided which of the 
provided alternatives was paired with a given cue in the study phase.  A condition in which 
two non-dud alternatives were provided, one being a target paired with this cue and the other 
being a target paired with other cues, was pitted against a condition in which the third, dud 
alternative was also included.  The dud alternative was novel, not paired previously with any 
cue, and thus easily rejected because of low familiarity.  Given that the paradigm is based on 
memory for perceptually impoverished but semantically rich materials, namely pairs of 
words, we assume that in our task, perceptual similarity of presented alternatives to the 
correct answer plays a negligible role.  Thus, if the dud-alternative effect in memory is 
restricted to situations in which duds affect perceptual similarity of non-dud alternatives to 
targets, then we would predict no dud-alternative effect in our paradigm.  If, however, the 
dud-alternative effect extends beyond such limited circumstances and obtains more broadly 
in confidence judgments provided in an episodic memory setting, we can expect this effect to 
occur in our paradigm. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  Forty undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for course 
credit or small monetary compensation (age: M = 19.13; 4 males).  
Materials and Design.  The experiment consisted of two study-test blocks, with one 
block corresponding to the dud-present condition and the other to the dud-absent condition.  
The order of the two block types was counterbalanced across participants.   
To generate the materials for the two blocks, 64 4-8 letter nouns with average ratings 
on various dimensions (e.g., lexical frequency, concreteness, imageability) were chosen from 
the MRC database.  Thirty-two words were used as study materials and the remaining 32 
words were used only as duds in a final test of the dud-present condition., The 32 study 
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words were randomly divided into two lists of 16 words, with separate lists to be used in each 
block (Figure 1).  For each list of 16 words, eight words were randomly chosen to act as cues 
and eight to act as targets.  Each of four cues (1-4) within each list was randomly paired with 
four different targets (A-D) to make 16 pairs (4 X 4), whereas each of the remaining four 
cues (5-8) was paired with each of the remaining four targets (E-H) to make another 16 pairs.  
Each resultant list of 32 pairs was presented three times within the study phase of each block 
for a total of 96 study trials per block.  List repetition did not occur until the previous list 
presentation was complete and a different random order of pairs was used within each list 
presentation.  Thus, in the study phase of each block, every cue and target word was seen for 
a total of 12 times each (four times within each list X three presentations of the list).  
Assignment of lists to blocks was counterbalanced across participants. (see Verde, 2004, for a 
similar arrangement of materials, referred to as interference sets). The aim of using 
interference sets was to allow for multiple presentations of individual cues and targets (to 
increase their familiarity) without producing ceiling effects in performance.  
 At each test trial, a single cue was presented with two or three alternatives 
corresponding to the dud-absent and dud-present conditions (blocks), respectively.  In the 
dud-absent condition, the alternatives included the target for the presented cue plus one of the 
four targets not paired with the cue (non-dud foil).  The same two alternatives were presented 
in the dud-present condition along with a new word not shown at study (dud foil).  The order 
of the two or three alternatives on the screen was random.  For both test conditions/blocks, 
every cue was presented four times corresponding to the four pairs for which the cue was 
presented at study.  Similarly, every target was presented eight times in each block, four 
times as a correct alternative and four times as a non-dud foil.  Every dud in the dud-present 
block was presented once only. 
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Procedure.  Participants were first instructed that they should memorize the pairs and 
that all pairs will be repeated several times.  At study each pair was presented for two 
seconds with a 0.5 second interval.  During study, there was no indication that the study list 
was complete and was about to be repeated either the first or second time.   
At test, participants were informed that they would be presented with individual cues 
from the study phase together with some alternatives out of which one and only one was a 
target previously paired with a given cue.  Participants were asked to rate each alternative for 
their confidence that it was paired with a given cue on a scale from 1 (very low confidence) 
to 6 (very high confidence).  Responding in the test was self-paced.  After the test for the first 
block was finished, the second study phase ensued and the test for this list followed. 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 1 presents mean confidence ratings for this experiment. Duds received very low 
confidence ratings (M = 1.15; SD = 0.27), indicating that participants were highly confident 
that duds were not paired with cues.  Following Windschitl and Chambers (2004), we did not 
actually require participants to choose a target from amongst the alternatives.  Instead, 
participants only rated confidence in each alternative.  However, by using confidence ratings, 
it is possible to determine target selection rate by examining the proportion of trials on which 
a target alternative was given the highest confidence rating from among presented 
alternatives. When a target and one of the remaining alternatives received the same highest 
confidence judgment, the trial was excluded from the analysis.2 A t-test comparing the 
proportion of included trials with targets receiving the highest confidence ratings failed to 
reveal a significant difference between the dud-present (M = .67; SD = .15) and dud-absent 
(M = .69; SD = .17) conditions, t < 1. This null result suggests that including duds does not 
affect participants’ ability to identify targets. 
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The confidence ratings given to non-dud alternatives were initially analyzed with an 
ANOVA that included the order of conditions as a factor.  However, this factor failed to 
produce any significant effects, so we collapsed the data from the two counterbalancing 
conditions.  A resulting 2 (alternative status) x 2 (test condition/block) repeated-measures 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of alternative status, F(1, 39) = 68.87, MSE = 0.89, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .64, which indicates that participants gave higher judgments for targets than 
for non-dud foils.  This main effect reflects a certain level of memory for associations.  More 
interestingly, the ANOVA also yielded a significant main effect of test condition, F(1, 39) = 
6.68, MSE = 0.29, p = .014, ηp2 = .15, with higher confidence ratings when duds were 
included in the test than if they were not.  The interaction was not significant, F(1, 39) = 1.63, 
MSE = 0.35, p > .20, indicating that duds affected confidence for both targets and non-dud 
foils.  These results indicate that the dud-alternative effect is present in our paradigm, 
extending this effect to a memory task in which the role of perceptual features of the assessed 
alternatives is negligible.² 
 The present results document the dud-alternative effect in associative recognition.  
Inclusion of dud alternatives in test trials led to higher confidence ratings for both targets and 
non-dud foils. Thus, at test, providing local context in the form of a highly implausible 
alternative elevates confidence for the remaining alternatives, even if the memory task is 
clearly not dependent on assessing perceptual similarity of alternatives to information stored 
in memory. This result demonstrates that the dud-alternative effect is a general phenomenon 
of episodic memory when people assess confidence for multiple alternatives concerning past 
events.  It is not limited to perceptually-driven tasks like the line-up procedure.  
However, Experiment 1 suffers from one important caveat. Although we have argued 
that duds constitute a local context for the remaining, non-dud alternatives on a given test 
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trial, one could argue that our implementation of duds in Experiment 1 has more to do with 
global than local context. Because the presence of duds was manipulated between blocks, all 
test trials in the dud-present block included duds. It is thus possible that duds do not exert 
their influence on confidence at the level of individual trials but rather at the level of the 
whole test. To tease apart these two possibilities, Experiment 2 manipulated the presence of 
duds within a single test. If duds serve as local context and elevate confidence only in trials in 
which they are included, we should replicate the dud-alternative effect in Experiment 2. If, in 
contrast, duds exert their influence at the general level of the whole test, we should obtain no 
dud-alternative effect in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants.  Twenty-four undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for 
course credit (age: M = 19.17; all females). 
Materials, Procedure, and Design.  One of the lists of cue-target pairs developed for 
the previous experiment was used together with half of the words that served as duds in the 
final test.  The study phase was the same as either study phase in Experiment 1.  In the test 
phase, half of the trials were presented with only two alternatives (target and non-dud foil) 
whereas the remaining half included an additional dud.  Presentation order of the two trial 
types was random. The assignment of items to the two test conditions was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 presents mean confidence for this experiment.  Confidence ratings for duds 
were again, as intended, very low (M = 1.12; SD = 0.21). The first analysis again looked at 
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the proportion of trials in which targets received the highest confidence rating.3 A t-test 
showed no significant difference between the dud-present (M = .73; SD = .16) and dud-absent 
(M = .70; SD = .16) conditions, replicating Experiment 1 and showing that inclusion of duds 
does not affect participants’ ability to identify targets.  A 2 (alternative status) x 2 (test 
condition) repeated measures ANOVA performed on the confidence ratings for the non-dud 
alternatives yielded a significant main effect of status, F(1, 23) = 50.50, MSE = 1.01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .69, which again indicates that participants gave higher judgments for targets 
than for non-dud foils.  More importantly, the main effect of the test condition was also 
significant, F(1, 23) = 9.51, MSE = 0.08, p = .005, ηp2 = .29.  These results are consistent 
with the results of Experiment 1 and indicate that the presence of duds inflated confidence 
judgments. The interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
Thus, Experiment 2 again documented that duds inflate confidence for non-dud 
alternatives, this time with the presence of duds manipulated within a single test.  This result 
suggests that duds serve as local context affecting confidence at the level of individual test 
trials. The theoretical underpinnings of these results are discussed next. 
General Discussion 
 In the present study we developed a novel paradigm for investigating the dud-
alternative effect in memory.  Using a variant of the associative recognition task, we created 
conditions under which an unfamiliar and therefore easily rejected dud alternative was 
included in the test, affecting confidence for the remaining, non-dud alternatives.  In two 
experiments, using a design in which the presence of duds was manipulated between blocks 
(Experiment 1), and a design in which the presence of duds was manipulated within a single 
test (Experiment 2), we documented that inclusion of duds inflates confidence for non-dud 
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alternatives, whether they are targets or non-dud foils.  These results speak to the robustness 
of the dud-alternative effect for confidence judgments concerning past events. 
 Regarding the mechanism of the dud-alternative effect, it is first important to note that 
this effect occurs robustly across different tasks. To date, it has been documented in the non-
episodic likelihood judgments tasks (Windschitl & Chambers, 2004), as well as episodic 
memory tasks such as line-up identification (Charman et al., 2011), and associative 
recognition (the present study). The mechanism of this effect should thus be general enough 
to account for its various manifestations. The present study is clearly inconsistent with the 
perceptual-similarity hypothesis developed by Charman et al. for their line-up study. Our 
results and those of Windschitl and Chambers indicate that the dud-alternative effect in 
episodic memory requires a broader theoretical framework.  
 In our view, the results of the investigations of the dud-alternative effect conducted to 
date remain consistent with the contrast hypothesis developed by Windschitl and Chambers 
(2004).  Duds create a local context to which evidence supporting the assessed alternative is 
compared.  Because duds differ greatly from the focal alternatives on the assessed dimension, 
when comparison against a dud is made, the perceived value on the assessed dimension for 
the focal alternative is greater, leading to higher confidence judgments. Charman et al. (2011) 
claimed that the contrast hypothesis was inconsistent with their results from the line-up 
procedure. They argued against this hypothesis, because duds in their line-ups increased 
confidence not only for the endorsed non-dud foil (they used only target-absent line-ups) but 
also for the other, unendorsed non-dud foil.  Moreover, duds affected confidence for 
participants who were precluded from choosing in a line-up.  Charman et al. reasoned that the 
contrast hypothesis predicts the dud-alternative effect only for the explicitly chosen 
alternative, which is compared against other alternatives.  
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However, in our view, Charman et al. (2011) might have unnecessarily restricted the 
meaning of ‘focal alternative’ in their analysis of the contrast hypothesis.  Our reading of 
Windschitl and Chamber’s (2004) use of the term suggests that a ‘focal alternative’ is any 
alternative for which confidence is currently being assessed.  Consequently, confidence for 
an assessed alternative could be affected by the presence of duds via the contrast mechanism 
even if it is not ultimately endorsed.  We consider the contrast hypothesis a possible 
overarching account of the dud-alternative effect that is able to provide a framework for 
understanding various manifestations of this effect.   
 A somewhat more detailed implementation of the contrast hypothesis may be offered 
by the aforementioned analysis of Tversky (1977). Tversky proposed that a local context may 
determine which features of the stimuli are considered diagnostic for a similarity judgment. 
In the case of perceptual similarity, providing a dud alternative may highlight and thus render 
diagnostic perceptual features of assessed line-up members that would otherwise be ignored. 
But this logic may be extended to other cases of similarity as well. In the case of the 
associative recognition task, the fact that two alternatives were both studied may not be 
deemed diagnostic when all words provided in the test trial were studied. However, when 
duds are included and non-duds alternatives are contrasted with duds, the fact that non-dud 
alternatives were studied becomes salient and thus diagnostic to the decision of which 
alternative was associated with the cue, inflating confidence judgments. The idea of 
diagnosticity of features developed by Tversky can be thus seen as a detailed specification of 
the contrast hypothesis proposed by Windschitl and Chambers (2004). 
We need to acknowledge, however, that an alternative account of the dud-alternative 
effect is also possible. Both Windschitl and Chambers (2004) and Charman et al. (2011) 
discussed a hypothesis that could be referred to as a recalibration hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, duds do not truly affect underlying subjective confidence for the assessed 
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alternatives but instead change the scale on which confidence judgments are made.  When 
duds are absent, confidence assigned to non-dud foils may create an anchor at the low end of 
the scale (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  However, when a dud alternative is included, 
the complete lack of confidence associated with this alternative may cause the confidence 
scale to be recalibrated.  Recalibration sets a new, lower anchor for the confidence scale, 
pushing the assigned confidence values for the remaining alternatives upward despite no 
actual change in the underlying subjective confidence.  Under this scenario, the dud-
alternative effect is more about how people define the low end of a response scale given a 
certain set of alternatives than it is about true changes in subjective confidence.  
Our results have some consequences for the recalibration hypothesis. Specifically, the 
fact that we observed the dud-alternative effect in Experiment 2, when the presence of duds 
was manipulated within a single test, suggests that if duds induce recalibration, then 
recalibration occurs not at the level of an entire test but at the level of individual trials. In 
other words, if the recalibration hypothesis is correct, our results would suggest that the way 
subjective confidence is translated into values on confidence scale is highly malleable and 
may be adjusted on the trial-by-trial basis. At present, the status of this novel, continuous 
recalibration hypothesis is unclear and further tests with dependent measures other than 
confidence judgments may be necessary to investigate it. We believe that our novel paradigm 
for investigating the dud-alternative effect can be used in further studies on this issue. 
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Footnotes 
1. Tulving (1981) distinguished between perceptual and ecphoric similarity in 
memory tasks, where perceptual similarity refers to similarity between items 
physically presented in a test and ecphoric similarity refers to similarity between 
items presented in a test and information stored in memory. In these terms, the 
hypothesis considered by Charman et al. (2011) states that perceptual dissimilarity 
between the assessed alternative and a dud leads to increased ecphoric similarity 
between the assessed alternative and stored memory for perpetrator. Here, 
however, we will refer to perceptual similarity as referring to perceived similarity 
between assessed alternative and memory for perpetrator. 
2. There were 5.15 trials (16% of all trials) excluded from the dud-present list and 
4.15 trials (13% of all trials) excluded from the dud-absent list. Importantly, the 
number of excluded trials did not differ between the lists, t(39) = 1.33, SE = .75, p 
= .19. 
3. We once again excluded from the analysis trials for which a target and one of the 
remaining alternatives received the same highest confidence judgment. There 
were 2.33 trials (15% of all trials) excluded from the dud-present condition and 
1.92 trials (12% of all trials) excluded from the dud-absent condition. The number 
of excluded trials did not differ between conditions, t < 1.  
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Table 1.  Mean Confidence Judgments In Experiments 1 and 2 as a Function of Test 
Condition (Dud-Present vs. Dud Absent) and Alternative Status (Target, Non-Dud Foil, Dud 
Alternative). Standard Deviations Are Given in Parentheses. 
 
 Experimental Condition 
    Item Dud-present Dud-absent 
Experiment 1 
Target 4.50 (0.58) 4.40 (0.66) 
Non-dud foil 3.38 (0.94) 3.04 (0.79) 
Dud alternative 1.15 (0.27) - 
Experiment 2 
Target 4.62 (0.61) 4.46 (0.66) 
Non-dud foil 3.17 (1.00) 2.98 (0.85) 
Dud alternative 1.12 (0.21) - 
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Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the design used in Experiment 1.  In the study list, numbers 
designate eight different word cues and letters designate eight different word targets.  For 
each of the two study-test blocks, 32 unique cue-target pairs were generated by pairing each 
cue with four targets as shown above.  In each block, the 32 pairs were presented in a random 
order for study, and then the same pairs were presented again a second time in a different 
random order, and then a third time in third random order.  This meant that each cue and 
target was viewed 12 times in total by the end of the 96 study trials for a given block, making 
them very familiar.  At test, participants were required to rate confidence in each alternative 
on each trial.  The alternatives were a target and a non-dud (familiar) foil in the dud-absent 
condition/block.  These same two words plus a new dud word not presented at study were the 
alternatives in the dud-present condition/block. 
